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7 March 1961

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
# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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


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
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## DAILY BRIEF

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Congo: The Tananarive round-table conference, scheduled to begin on 5 March, has been delayed to await the arrival of Kasavubu and Gizenga. There has been no further fighting between UN forces and the Congolese troops in Matadi and Banana, and both UN and Congolese authorities have reportedly agreed, for the time being, not to send reinforcements to the Lower Congo region. Further clashes seem likely, however, since Hammarskjold has insisted that UN forces must reoccupy Matadi, while Kasavubu's Foreign Minister Bomboko stated on 6 March that Matadi would not be returned to the UN pending a full investigation. Khartoum has announced that Sudanese troops will be withdrawn from the Congo because of alleged "grave mistakes" by UN officials during the recent clashes. [redacted] (Backup, Page 1) (Map)

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France: The fourth French nuclear test, earlier expected for March or April, has been postponed by "at least several weeks" for technical reasons, [redacted]

[redacted] France probably wishes to avoid for the time being a potentially disruptive influence on negotiations with the Algerian rebels. [redacted]


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[redacted] France was determined to continue testing unless the US would provide the nuclear weapons information necessary for France to develop a nuclear capability without benefit of tests. [redacted]

[redacted] French technicians reportedly still hope the fourth test, expected to be a small-yield device from a tower at the Reggane test site, can be held in May before the intense summer heat which would force a further delay until autumn. [redacted]

[redacted] the first of the French underground tests [redacted]

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is scheduled for October 1961, at Bordj In Eker. Two tunnels are being bored in granite for underground testing. The first shot will be a device tested in a 1200-meter tunnel, of which 900 meters has been completed, while the second underground test, about one month later, will be an experimental bomb which is expected to be tested in another tunnel of 1400-meter length, of which 600 meters has been completed. French experts are also planning to test an atomic bomb, capable of being dropped from a Mirage IV aircraft, in April 1962. (SE-  
 [REDACTED] (Map)

Argentina-Cuba: Argentina has decided to send special envoys to the United States and Cuban governments to seek means of alleviating "tension" between the two countries, despite its previous skepticism regarding the value of single-country mediation efforts. This action is probably intended to counter the apparent bid of Brazilian President Quadros for Latin American leadership through a play to leftist sentiment. Although officials have denied that domestic political considerations are responsible for the move, it is probably also influenced in part by the recent electoral triumph in Buenos Aires of a Socialist deputy who campaigned on a pro-Castro platform.  
 [REDACTED] (Backup, Page 2)

Bolivia: President Victor Paz Estenssoro told American Ambassador Strom on 5 March that his government plans extensive arrests of Communist trade union leaders if the Confederation of Urban Teachers--which is reported under strong Communist influence--continues its strike for higher wages after the morning of 7 March. Anticipating possible violence, Paz is asking for tear-gas grenades, machine-gun ammunition, and small bombs for use in P-51 aircraft, from the United States. A substantial wage increase for teachers would strengthen wage demands from other government employees and impede the Paz government's drive to increase the country's production. The powerful unions of the nationalized tin mines are threatening to strike beginning 8 March.  
 [REDACTED]

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The UN probably desires to negotiate a re-entry into Matadi, but appears to be committed to fight if necessary. Matadi is the Congo's only port, and control of it is necessary to ensure the continued arrival of food and supplies under UN auspices.

Reasons cited in the Sudanese communiqué on withdrawal of Sudanese troops from the Congo included "negligence" in the deployment of these troops to areas known to have defied the UN and failure to dispatch reinforcements quickly. The communiqué also asserted that UN officials did not adopt a firm attitude toward "imperialists" and thus contributed to chaos in the Congo. Sudan's withdrawal of all its troops will be likely to encourage other African countries to review their policy. Sudanese dissatisfaction with UN operations could also lead to a reconsideration by Khartoum of its repeated refusals to permit bloc aid to reach Gizenga via Sudan.

[REDACTED], the government was unable to pay the salaries of government employees and the army in full on 1 March. [REDACTED]

Gizenga's attempts to increase the international prestige of his regime are continuing. The Warsaw press announced on 2 March that Stanleyville had appointed an ambassador to Poland. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] an ambassador to Peiping has been designated. Gizenga, worried about the financing of diplomatic missions, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] "friendly countries" will be consulted for material support. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] East Germany has named a minister to Stanleyville. Czechoslovakia has appointed an ambassador, but neither of these has been able to secure transit rights through the Sudan. [REDACTED]

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### Argentina to Send Special Envoys to US and Cuba

In its reply to Cuba's circular note of late February soliciting sympathy from the various Latin American governments, Argentina announced its intention to send special envoys to the US and Cuban governments. Argentina apparently acted without consulting any of the other countries in advance.

A Foreign Ministry official said on 4 March that Argentina's initiative was based on the following considerations: 1) the Cuban situation remains a disturbing influence on the relations of other countries with the US; 2) a solution to the problem must be one which will eliminate Soviet and Communist influence in Cuba and, without arousing leftist elements in the hemisphere, stop Cuba's efforts to spread its revolution abroad; and 3) the overthrow of Castro by anti-Castro Cubans from the US or Guatemala would probably prompt criticism which would worsen inter-American relations.

Argentina's action, however, is probably intended primarily for its effect on public opinion both at home and abroad. Heretofore, Argentina has been the strongest critic of Cuba among the large Latin American countries and has maintained that the Cuban problem should be handled only through the OAS. Recently, however, President Frondizi expressed doubt that a vote for collective action would get even a slim majority.

Brazilian President Quadros' statements on Cuba increase pressure on Frondizi to make a gesture of his own on Cuba. A Brazilian press report on 4 March quoted Quadros as stating that "even supposing that there is Communist infiltration in the Cuban Government, the Castro revolution has our sympathies and we are not in any manner disposed to uphold any action contrary to the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs of other countries so long as Castro does not try to export Fidelismo."

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